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Cultivating Compliance: Governance of North Indian Organic Basmati 
Smallholders in a Global Value Chain 
Abstract 
We study (re)arrangements of a local socio-technical setting entailed in the making of a globalized 
commodity. Focussing on a global value chain (GVC) for organic basmati rice, we study how farmers’ 
practices are governed through product and process standards, organic certification protocols, and 
contracts with buyer firms. We analyse how farmers’ entry into the GVC reconfigures their 
agencements (defined as heterogeneous arrangements of human and non-human agencies that are 
associated with each other). These reconfigurations entail the severance of some associations among 
procedural and material elements of the agencements and the formation of new associations, in order to 
produce cultivation practices that are accurately described by the GVC’s standards and protocols.  
Based on ethnography of two farmers in Uttarakhand, North India, we find that the same standards 
were enacted differently on the two farmers’ fields, producing variable degrees of (selective) 
compliance with the ‘official’ GVC standards. We argue that the disjuncture between the standards’ 
‘official’ scripts and actual cultivation practices must be nurtured for allowing farmers’ agencements to 
align their practices with local socio-technical relations and farm-ecology. Furthermore, we find that 
compliance and disjuncture was facilitated by many practices and associations that were officially 
‘ungoverned’ by the GCC.  
Abstract word count: 198 words 
Article word count: 9780 (including references) 
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Introduction 
Mangoes from Brazil, coffee from Ethiopia, soy beans from Argentina, and rice from India and 
Thailand, some certified organic, are only a small subset of agricultural products traded and produced 
in internationally dispersed assemblages of producers and buyers. These assemblages were first studied 
as global commodity chains (GCC’s) by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) and in later reincarnations as 
global production networks (GPNs) and value chains (GVCs), governed by public and private 
standards for food safety, quality and ‘sustainability’.  
The GCC and GVC governance literature has provided insights into lead firms’ power in driving 
a GVC and different forms of coordination that emerge between buyers and suppliers depending on 
characteristics of the traded product and capabilities of their suppliers. Until recently however, 
‘governance in practice’ was rarely studied in the GVC literature, obscuring the socio-technical 
practices through which standards, certification protocols and contracts are enacted in specific socio-
technical settings. Recent work on GVC governance and on agro-food standards more generally has 
shown how standardization produces ontological transformations through a re-arrangement of existing 
socio-technical relations (Ouma et al, 2011; Berndt and Boeckler, 2011; Konefal and Hatanaka, 2011; 
van der Kamp, 2011). The present article contributes to this literature in three ways. 
First, using theoretical insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS), on socio-technical 
agencements or ‘heterogeneous arrangements of human and non-human agencies’ (Callon 2007; 2008; 
Çalişkan and Callon, 2010), we view GVC governance as the severance of (some) associations among 
procedural and material elements of farmers’ agencements and the parallel formation of new 
associations. Second, based on ethnographies of two farmers’ practices, we show that these re-
associations are supplier-specific due to, a) different roles played by (the same) human and non-human 
actors in farmers’ agencements and b) the nature of their ‘inclusive exclusions’ (Mitchell, 2007). The 
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latter refer to practices and associations that fall outside the purview of GVC governance, but were 
instrumental in the making of a standardized product, blurring the boundaries between governed and 
ungoverned elements of the farmers’ agencements. Third, in this process, the GVC’s standards were 
differently adjusted to the farmers’ fields, enacting a multiplicity of actual practices that cannot be 
accurately described by singular ‘official’ GVC standards. Then, differently standardized, the two 
farmers produced the ‘same’ product. 
The specific product we study is basmati, the aromatic rice of North India and Pakistan. In India, 
the most aromatic of basmati varieties were grown in the foothills of the Himalayas, particularly in 
Dehradun district of Uttarakhand. Over the last decade, rapid urbanization has led to a substantial 
decline in Dehraduni basmati production. The local government has attempted to promote (organic) 
basmati cultivation in the rural periphery of the district. We study one such programme led by the 
Uttarakhand Organic Commodities Board (UOCB). It is organized through contract farming, in which 
an exporting firm signs a contract jointly with a group of small farmers to purchase organic basmati for 
sale in Europe and the United States. 
The article is structured as follows. We begin with an overview of the literature on GCC/GVC 
governance without explicitly noting any differences between commodity chain and value chain 
approaches (for literature reviews, see Bair, 2009; Gibbon et al, 2008). We also provide an overview of 
relevant literature on (organic) standards and certification in the agro-food sector. Subsequently, we 
outline the three theoretical concepts used: sociotechnical agencements, enactment and inclusive 
exclusions. This is followed by a discussion of our fieldwork methods and an analysis empirical 
material, focusing on two farmers’ cultivation practices under organic contract farming for export. A 
final section presents the conclusions. 
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Governance of Global Agro-food Value Chains 
Issues of governance or ‘forms of coordination’ between buyers and suppliers have been central to the 
global commodity and value chain literatures.1 In early conceptualizations of chain governance as 
buyer- or producer-driven (e.g. Gereffi, 1994), lead firms exercise “control through the specification of 
what product needs to be delivered, in what quantity and when, how it should be produced and at what 
price.” (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005:5, citing Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002).  
A somewhat more nuanced approach to chain governance was developed by Gereffi et al (2005). 
Based on notions of asymmetry and complexity of information and knowledge embedded in products 
that are transacted, Gereffi et al listed five modes of governance: market, modular, relational, captive 
and hierarchy. Increasing information complexity and switching costs to new partners engenders a 
move from market to hierarchy.  
A third fledgling approach interprets GVC governance through the lens of governmentality, 
highlighting the role of expert discourses in ‘coordinating’ buyer-supplier relations and shaping 
production and exchange practices of chain members (Larner and Le Heron, 2004; Gibbon and Ponte, 
2008; also see Lockie and Higgins, 2007 for a non-GVC setting). Governmentality entails a “set of 
programmatic rationalizations of the proper roles of economic agents and institutions and a set of 
techniques and tactics for engineering conformity to these roles.” (Gibbon and Ponte, 2008:367). 
Existing governmentality studies have largely focused on expert discourses, studying how 
programmatic rationalizations are linked to ‘techniques and tactics’ of governing (Higgins and Larner, 
2010).  
                                                
1 The rise of governance as an analytical category in the last two decades is not restricted to the GCC or GVC literature. 
Governance, networked and beyond the state, is argued to involve “rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate and 
control social life” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:2). The concept has been endorsed for its emphasis on processes rather than 
institutions of rule and criticized for its neoliberal inclinations and anti-politics (see Walters, 2004). Neoliberalism in the 
agro-food sector has intensified private governance through quality standards and certification protocols, supplementing and 
substituting governmental regulations on food (see e.g. Busch, 2010; Tallontire, 2007; Henson and Reardon, 2005).
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The foregoing three approaches to GVC governance rarely discuss how supplier compliance, to 
desired performance characteristics (product quality) and quantity requirements, is actually achieved on 
the ground. In the first approach, the massive power vested in the lead firms is assumed to produce 
supplier compliance. In the second, structural variables underlying product characteristics, such as 
information complexity, steer chain governance toward the ‘right’ modes in which supplier compliance 
is automatically produced. The third approach’s discursive focus leads to a neglect of socio-material 
encounters in which techniques of governing (such as standards, certifications and contracts) are 
actually put into practice. All three leave central questions of the techniques’ entanglement with local 
socio-technical relations unexamined (cf. Ouma et al, 2011). 
Recent work has begun to examine how a GVC’s techniques of governing get rooted in specific 
spatial-historical conjunctures through processes of (dis)articulation with pre-existing practices and 
institutions (Bair and Werner, 2011; Ouma, 2010; for older work along these lines, see Tsing, 2005; 
and Dunn, 2003). Producers’ entry into global commodity/value chains is argued to effect an 
‘ontological transformation’ of existing institutional settings, socio-technical relations, production 
practices and natural orders (Ouma et al, 2011; Berndt and Boeckler, 2011; Bain and Hatanaka, 2010). 
The implementation of GVC standards, contracts and models of supply chain management (Busch, 
2007), rearranges relations between people, things and procedures. Yet this process of rearrangement is 
never frictionless or uniform, but a disorderly one that requires sustained efforts and mutual 
adjustments (between the techniques of governing and the targets of governance) to produce desired 
orderings of the world (Ouma et al, 2011; Mitchell, 2007). 
 A similar emphasis on ontological transformations can be observed in recent literature on agro-
food standards and certification (organic as well as others such as GLOBALG.A.P). The early critical 
strands of this literature argued that the formalization of organic practices through standards and 
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certification, a) dilutes agro-ecological ideals of on-farm production and recycling of materials 
(Guthman, 2004; 2000; Buck et al, 1997), and b) marginalizes small farmers’ voice and interests as 
compared to their larger counterparts (González and Nigh, 2005; Tovar et al, 2005; also see Muradian 
and Pelupessy, 2005 for similar work within a GVC). Others argued that these negative impacts could 
be countered through group certification, strong smallholder associations and connections with 
transnational social movements (e.g. Goldberger, 2008; and Raynolds, 2008; 2004 within GVC and 
GPN approaches). 
Research has also attempted to foreground farmers’ agency in negotiating and contesting the 
standards, studying how farmers adapt certification protocols to gain advantages such as improved 
management and prioritisation of tasks, increased role of women in management, and pride for being 
recognized as ‘good’ farmers (Higgins et al, 2010; 2008). More recently, scholars have observed that 
farmers interpret and enact the same organic standards and certification protocols in radically different 
ways (e.g. Konefal and Hatanaka, 2011; van der Kamp, 2011; Hatanaka, 2010). This heterogeneity is 
not simply a consequence of different farm-sizes or levels of commitment to organic agriculture (cf. 
Guthman, 2000), but rather a result of farmers’ attempts to comply by (re)assembling the desired non-
human elements of organic farming in accordance with their farm-level socio-economic and material 
arrangements (van der Kamp, 2011; Konefal and Hatanaka, 2011). In and through this process, 
standards attempt to make “the realities they claim to describe” by manipulating and transforming 
existing farming arrangements (Busch, 2011:1; also see Timmermans and Epstein, 2010 for the same 
argument about standards more generally). 
The present article contributes to this recent literature on the ‘ontology’ of organics and GVC 
governance in the following ways. First, we are more alert to differences between individual farmers’ 
experiences than the GVC studies (e.g. Ouma et al, 2011; Berndt and Boeckler, 2011). Second, in our 
8 
 
work the source of these differences do not primarily lie in the flexibility of organic standards (van der 
Kamp, 2011), but also in the different types of surveillance the farmers experienced, the nature of their 
inclusive exclusions and the different roles played by (non-)human actors in their agencements. Third, 
unlike Konefal and Hatanaka (2011), in our work, farmers’ agency cannot be reduced to the poles of 
compliance or non-compliance driven by a search for monetary benefit. By studying cultivation 
practices, we were able to observe different degrees of (selective) compliance which are relationally 
produced within individual farming arrangements. 
Socio-Technical Agencements and Enactment 
We analyze governing in practice as the reconfiguration of socio-technical agencements. The French 
meaning of agencement is close to arrangement and it “has the same root as agency: agencements are 
[heterogeneous] arrangements endowed with the capacity of acting” (Callon, 2007:320). Agencements 
are made up of a range of entities including human bodies, technological artefacts (prostheses, tools, 
equipments), mathematical models and algorithms, which are associated with each other (on 
associations among human and non-human entities, see Latour, 2005). Agency is distributed across 
multiple entities and all action is collective. Yet the mechanisms that attribute an individual or 
collective as the source of action vary between different agencements (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010:10). 
In fact, even when agency appears to be centred on an individual who sets goals and executes a set of 
actions, her ability to set goals and act on them is made possible because she is not acting alone 
(Callon, 2008). For instance, when a farmer transplants rice saplings from a nursery to a field, a group 
of heterogeneous entities participate in the collective process. These include farm workers, their deals 
with the farmer regarding wages and working hours, standards that specify the desired spacing between 
saplings, bunches of saplings tied with strings, ploughs, tractor, irrigation canals, regulations that 
govern access to canal water, inlets from canals to the field, etc.. Furthermore, Callon (2008:35) argues 
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that the sequence of smaller actions required to complete a collective action can vary depending on 
events (“distributed action is organized but cannot be reduced to a pre-established plan”); and none of 
the participating entities in this action can be considered independently of each other (for instance, a 
farm worker will not be able to transplant if the sludge on the field has not been prepared by a tractor, 
ploughs, soil and water).  
An agencement is made up of three sets of intertwined elements: discursive, procedural and 
material that may include the corporeal (Callon, 2008). In contract farming, discursive elements may 
include government claims of poverty alleviation by connecting smallholders to markets, or the 
argument that ‘expert’ support available to farmers under contract farming can replace declining public 
investments in agriculture (extension services etc.). Procedural elements are quality and food safety 
standards, certification protocols, regulations that shape farm-labour markets, etc. And material 
elements refer to farmers’ and workers’ bodies and non-human things such as tools and tractors, which 
participate in an agencement’s collective action.  
The discursive or procedural elements of an agencement, as statements, describe and guide its 
actions. The latter may be viewed as socio-material practices.2 For instance, standards and contracts, as 
procedural elements describe certain desired characteristics of a product and define the specific roles 
that different actors should play in producing the product. Not only do these descriptions and 
definitions act as guideposts for action, they also participate in it, formatting socio-material practices 
and the overall configuration of an agencement while themselves getting adjusted to it. Through these 
mutual adjustments, different socio-material practices (e.g. of farmers) and the standards are 
simultaneously enacted, acted upon and afforded by others to work (Law and Urry, 2004; Mol, 2010). 
                                                
2 Practices as treated here are “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared 
practical understanding.” (Schatzki, 2001:11, emphasis added). In practices of a socio-technical agencement, however, non-
humans (including procedures and statements) do more than just mediate human activities, they themselves act.  
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Enactment then entails the parallel dissociations and associations which standardize or reconfigure the 
farmers’ agencements such that the (adjusted) standards, a) produce the desired practices and products; 
and b) provide an accurate description of the practices.  
In agencements, many associations and practices of farmers are likely to fall outside the purview 
of GVC standards and protocols. Enactment then actualizes a boundary between parts of a farmer’s 
agencement that are directly governed by standards, certifications and contracts and those that are left 
outside the frame of GVC governance. This boundary is not uniform: as we will show later, one farmer 
may be more successful than another in situating some of his/her practices and associations outside 
GVC governance. The actual boundary is transient, ambiguous and contested. It is also porous or leaky. 
We analyze this shifting boundary by studying cases of what Mitchell (2007) terms ‘inclusive 
exclusions’ in which various associations that exist outside the (orderings of the) world of standards 
and certifications, and so of the GVC, are also partially inside. Thus, by being neither completely 
outside nor quite inside, the inclusively excluded blur the boundary between governed and 
‘ungoverned’ products/practices. 
The concept of agencement not only allows us to study the ‘inclusive exclusions’ but also 
foregrounds farmers’ agency in dealing with GVC standards. This agency however is not reduced to 
rational or strategic actions by an individual farmer driven by incentives or commitments, but rather 
distributed across a network of human and non-human entities (including the GVC standards) that 
constitute the farmer’s agencement. The adaptation of GVC standards by a farmer is then viewed as 
incorporation of the standards into her agencement. This incorporation ‘localizes’ the standards, 
adjusting them to the other elements of an agencement. The adjustments or modifications may remain 
confined to the farmer’s world, producing no effect on the official GVC scripts of the standard. In this 
way, our focus on farmers’ agencements allows us to study the double life of standards which 
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manifests when official GVC scripts are different from farmers’ own interpretations/descriptions of the 
standards. Only the latter may be enacted and aligned with actual socio-material practices on the farm.  
The relational-material perspective we have proposed above yields a detailed understanding of 
individual farmers’ responses to the ‘same’ standards, which play out differently in different 
agencements. Furthermore, using the concept of enactment, we are able to study GVC governance 
(standardization, certification) in action as the re-shaping of cultivation practices through making and 
unmaking of associations among the elements of a farmer’s agencement. 
Fieldwork methods 
The empirical material for the research was gathered in two phases. First, in order to map the 
organizational framework within which contract farming and standardization were implemented, we 
collected documentary evidence from the offices of the UOCB and the buyer firm. Second, we 
conducted detailed ethnographies from June 2010 to January 2011 on two farmers’ fields in order to 
map their  cultivation practices (e.g. for transplantation and pest control), involving interdependent 
human and non-human actors, as they attempted to comply with GVC standards. One of us (NAME 
SUPPRESSED FOR PEER REVIEW) conducted the bulk of this ‘praxiographic’ fieldwork (Mol, 
2002). She carried out ethnographic observation, and open interviews that were oriented by the 
researcher’s as well as the informant’s concerns, in order to write chronological field notes (Emerson et 
al, 1995). In-depth interviews with the two farmers and a few farm-labourers, complemented by 
observations, allowed us to develop a thorough understanding of the interdependent roles played by 
different actors in the farmers’ agencements. Other farmers, whose fields were not ethnographically 
observed, were also interviewed to form a wider impression of differences in organic cultivation in the 
area. Interviews with employees of the UOCB, the certification agency and the buyer firm were 
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conducted jointly by two authors. In all thirty two interviews were conducted, seven of which were 
with the first focal farmer and four with the second. Also, field activities of extension officers and 
inspectors from these organizations were observed as they did their interactive work on the farmers’ 
fields.  
Our presence in the field was not considered extraordinary by our informants, who 
wholeheartedly supported our research, perhaps because a number of social scientists (from India and 
abroad) had already visited the area to study Organic Uttarakhand in recent years. We did nevertheless 
produce some overt effects in the farmers’ agencements, although we cannot be certain about the 
source of any of these effects. First, farmers may have allowed us to observe only those practices that 
they deemed largely uncontroversial. For instance, if we wanted to observe some specific pest control 
practices, they would give us a date on which they will perform them, but upon arriving on that date, 
we would be informed that they had already carried out those practices one or two days earlier. At the 
same time, however, the farmers openly shared some other controversial features of the wider organic 
agriculture programme initiated by the UOCB with us, often problematizing their own participation in 
it. Secondly, our discussion with the local extension officer regarding serious problems with organic 
cultivation faced by one of our farmer-respondents led to more frequent visits by the officer to the 
farmer’s field (in order to assist her and perhaps to monitor her compliance more directly). Overall, we 
felt that farmers were too busy dealing with everyday problems of cultivating good basmati with 
reasonable yields, under unfavourable weather conditions (heavy monsoon and floods), to be able to 
significantly alter their practices for staging a particular version of organic agriculture for us only.  
The two farmers are located within the same socioeconomic setting and historical conjuncture. 
They belong to the same farmers’ federation, located in Rajnagar (pseudonym, a sub-district of 
Dehradun), contracted by the same firm (which buys organic basmati for export), and 
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supported/inspected by the same agricultural extension officers and inspectors. Yet, the farmers also 
differ from each other: the bigger farmer, a male, owns 4 ha of land, belongs to an ‘upper’ Brahman 
caste and is a prominent member of the local farmers’ federation. The second farmer, a woman, is a 
member of a ‘lower’ dhobi (washerman) caste, owns about 1 ha land and lives in a remote village that 
does not play an important role in running federation affairs. In this article, we do not directly invoke a 
prior socio-cultural context, in terms of caste, class, gender, or religion, to explain the two farmers’ 
divergent experience with GVC standards (cf. Latour, 2005:215).3 The effects of caste, class and 
gender remain implicit in the two farmers’ agencements.  
Our detailed, and one may say rather restricted, focus on just two farmers raises questions 
regarding the representativeness of our sample. We do not and cannot claim that our two-strong sample 
is representative of farmers’ experience with organic farming in Dehradun. Our aim is to highlight the 
different ways in which standards are enacted in practice on farmers’ fields and through their 
agencements. Our praxiographies afford ample opportunities to foreground the distributed nature of 
these differences. This article then may be viewed as an attempted demonstration of the ontological 
primacy of difference over identity (Deleuze 1994:64-69). Furthermore, in addition to not being 
spatially representative, we cannot lay claim to temporal representativeness. The re-configuration of the 
two farmers’ agencements that we mapped had not stabilized at the time of our fieldwork (we do not 
know if they ever will). Thus, our accounts of the two farmers’ different experiences tell unfinished 
stories. They are perhaps best viewed as allegories that, in their unfinished state, enable “the gathering 
in tension of multiple, sometimes contradictory realities” (Moreira, 2012:317, citing Law, 2004:97-
                                                
3 Caste and gender however do not have to be treated as part of a social context. Ethnographically, one can observe how 
they are enacted and practised in every day life. We were unable to carry out ethnographies of caste and gender relations 
due to c) time constrains during the field work and b) strict adherence to ethnomethodological principles which led to the 
neglect of those issues that were not explicitly invoked by the farmers. This is a limitation we discuss at the end of this 
article.     
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100). 
Defining an Organizational Framework 
Certified organic basmati cultivation in Dehradun was incubated in a large World Bank-funded 
‘Diversified Agricultural Support Project’ (DASP). Initiated in 1998 and anchored in the provincial 
government, DASP emphasized market-led and private-public interventions in agricultural and 
environmentally sustainable development (Kumar, 2004). This made contract farming for organic 
export, supported by a government body, an ideal activity to initiate and promote. 
DASP’s organic work was later taken over by the Uttarakhand Organic Commodities Board 
(UOCB), the provincial government’s ‘nodal agency’ for promoting organic agriculture and 
horticulture. Set up in May 2003 as an independent body under the Societies Registration Act 1860, the 
UOCB provides marketing and training support to farmers and conducts training programmes for 
extension officers from government and non-governmental organizations. In addition, the UOCB 
provides its own organic extension services to the farmers. Its officers are also meant to assist the 
contracting firms to carry out their monitoring and purchasing activities in the region. In accordance 
with international rules for group certification of smallholders’ produce (IFOAM, 2003), the UOCB 
has set up an internal control system (ICS) that precedes the inspections carried out by an external 
certification agency.  
To facilitate the certification, each farmer must keep a diary in which s/he jots down the inputs 
used (e.g. for plant protection) and the practices carried out in the field on a certain date. This includes 
the names and quantities of the bio-pesticides and fertilizers used and the place from where they are 
procured. The diary serves as the basis of the ICS. The official procedure of ICS requires that an 
identifiable internal inspector must be appointed, and farmers’ field records (diaries) and maps of their 
farms must be made available (IFOAM, 2003). In addition, the internal inspector must visit each 
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farmer’s field at least once during the cultivation season of rice and prepare a report for the external 
inspector from the certification agency.  
The external inspection has to ensure that the farmers’ produce adheres to the criteria for 
certification specified by the National Program for Organic Production (NPOP). The certification 
agency should also be accredited to ensure compliance with organic standards associated with export 
markets of the EU and the USA (UOCB, 2007). In 2006, the Uttarakhand State Organic Certification 
Agency (USOCA) was accredited by the National Accreditation Board of the government of India for 
NPOP and for standards of the European Union (EC 2092/91, later revised to EC 834/2007) and the 
United States (National Organic Standards, USDA). During the external inspection, USOCA must 
inspect a sample of 16-22 farms from a group of 250-500 farmers (NPOP, 2005), prioritizing those 
farmers that are deemed to be high risk of deviating from the organic protocols (based on the ICS 
report).  
Rajnagar organic farmers are organized into a federation that receives the group certification. The 
federation maintains an office in the largest, most central, town of Rajnagar sub-district. The buyer firm 
signs a contract with the federation, in which the UOCB acts as a third party to facilitate the buyer-
seller relationship. The contract specifies quality standards including maximum moisture content of 
16%; percentage of red coloured, unripe green and broken/diseased grains not exceeding 0.5%, 4% and 
0.5% respectively. Food safety standards (the ISO or Codex Alimentarius), such as those on organic 
and inorganic contamination, are translated as prescriptions to farmers to keep their produce ‘clean’. 
The roles of the buyer firm include the provision of organic basmati seeds and other farm-inputs 
(e.g. bio-pesticides) on credit to farmers. Since 2007, the firm has promoted and sold seeds only for the 
longer-grain varieties of basmati such as the Taraori (HBC-19),4 after procuring them from fields in 
                                                
4 The length of the kernel is perhaps the most important characteristic of basmati in Europe and the USA. For instance, the 
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another North Indian province. After the harvest, the firm grades the quality of the produce and collects 
it from Dehradun. Quality is decided on the basis of the standards specified in the contract. For grade A 
basmati, farmers receive an ‘organic premium’ (Rupees 400 per quintal in 2010) on the market price 
prevailing at the time of sale. On grade B, the premium is lower (Rupees 100 per quintal). The contract 
also states that the firm is not obliged to buy anything graded below B.  
To ensure ‘correct’ or standard organic cultivation practices, the firm distributes and attempts to 
implement a package of practices among farmers. The firm claims to have designed this package of 
practices (PoP) based on its own research findings. It also supports farmers’ attempts to comply with 
the PoP through field visits by its trainer and inspector. This trainer/inspector visits fields to monitor 
practices and advises farmers on how to use the ‘correct’ methods (which ostentatiously follow food 
safety standards and organic protocols). In addition, together with a UOCB employee, he often 
provides training to farmers in the federation office. The UOCB promotes an alternate PoP, which is 
less detailed than that of the firm regarding some practices such as nursery preparation and 
transplanting. Both packages discuss the same plant diseases and pest incidences that can occur on a 
basmati field. For pest control, the UOCB’s PoP only suggests solutions that can be prepared on the 
farm and the use of inexpensive bio-pesticides such as Trichoderma and Pseudomonas. While the 
firm’s PoP also calls for additional solutions based on more expensive bio-pesticides that can be bought 
off-the-shelf from federation offices. 
The organizational framework discussed above enunciates which associations and practices of 
the farmers are to be governed by the GVC’s standards and organic protocols. In this way, the 
organizational framework attempts to pre-determine the boundaries between governed and ungoverned 
                                                                                                                                                                 
German firm Rapunzel requires a minimum kernel length of 6mm for basmati rice from its suppliers (Volkman, 2010). 
Basmati of course comes in many shapes and sizes and the local type-3 variety that the UOCB promotes has a shorter 
(uncooked) grain size. 
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segments of the farmers’ agencements. It also aims to direct actual inspections and farmers’ attempts to 
comply. However, the relational nature of this work of compliance ensures that the actual boundary 
between governed and ungoverned practices turns out to be different for different farmers, 
particularizing the general organizational framework to a farmer’s unique agencement.  
Adjusting Standards, Formatting Practices 
Standardization often works by aligning standards (e.g. technical specifications) with certification and 
other legally-binding mechanisms such as contracts (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010; Lampland and 
Star, 2009). In this way, the different technologies of governing are made to work in concert with each 
other. First, as already noted, the buyer-seller contract states the quality standards that must be 
complied with. The same contract also facilitates the certification process by stating that only certified 
organic basmati will be bought by the firm. This need of certification makes many farmers wary of 
using any farm-inputs that are not endorsed by the UOCB or are certified organic. Additionally, the 
crop of an entire federation receives a single certification, so if one farmer is ‘caught’ breaking the 
protocols of organic cultivation, the whole group risks losing its certification. This system can facilitate 
compliance through social control (at the village level). Yet it may also afford collective subversion of 
certification protocols, especially in villages with strong internal solidarity where farmers using non-
recommended practices may look out for each other in an attempt to ensure that no farmer is ‘caught’ 
during an inspection. 
Second, diaries are important entities in farmers’ agencements, which may facilitate compliance 
with process standards specified in the PoPs. A UOCB employee checks the diaries on one of her/his 
regular visits to the farmers’ fields. Upon finding the diaries empty, s/he fills in the ‘correct’ details, 
completing the diaries before the internal and external inspections take place. This diary-filling routine 
makes some farmers (who feel unsure about filling the diaries themselves) dependent on UOCB 
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employees to receive their certification, thus making them more susceptible to employees’ influence. In 
addition, this routine transforms the certification process itself. By filling in the ‘correct’ farm-inputs 
and practices, a UOCB employee may greatly facilitate the work of inspectors who then find the 
desired evidence. Thus, the diaries serve a dual purpose: in farmers’ agencements, they act as 
discursive entities that are generally in accord with the GVC protocols while, at the same time, 
(re)constituting an unequal relationship between UOCB employees and some farmers.  
Third, the supply of standard seeds (and other farm-inputs such as bio-pesticides) on credit by the 
firm plays an important role in reconfiguring the farmers’ agencements. As stipulated by the contract, 
all farmers must purchase seeds from the buyer firm. Farmers sow these seeds in the hope that they will 
harvest ‘high quality’ produce desired by the firm, which will fetch the organic premium. The quality 
of the farmers’ produce is graded at the time of sale by a qualification ‘expert’ appointed by the firm. 
Many farmers fear that they will lose their organic premium if the expert found out that they had 
cultivated their own farm-saved seeds.5 In this way, upon entering farmers’ agencements, the 
interlocked standards, certification and contracts attempt to dissociate farmers from farm-saved seeds 
while associating them with seeds bought on credit from the buyer firm. Yet some farmers, who are 
confident of the superior quality of their own seeds, purchase the firm’s seeds but cultivate their own 
farm-saved ones. Thus, the enactment of standards does not normalize all farmers’ practices equally. In 
the following, we illustrate this differential enactment by focusing on practices of two farmers. We also 
analyze the actualization of different porous boundaries between governed and ungoverned practices 
and associations in the two farmers’ agencements. The two farmers are Shri Verma and Shrimati 
Sareen (pseudonyms).  
                                                
5 Farmers reported incidents in the past when the buyer firm, claiming that the crop is contaminated or it contains more than 
one variety of basmati, has refused to purchase a farmer’s produce (or offered a lower price). This rejection of the crop was 
often linked to the accusation that the farmer had used farm-saved seeds rather than those purchased from the firm. 
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Shri Verma 
Shri Verma started cultivating organic basmati during the DASP, roughly ten years ago. He is a 
prominent farmer, famous for his experiments and extensive knowledge of organic techniques. He has 
been a member of the board of the Rajnagar organic farmers’ federation and of the UOCB’s advisory 
council. His crop is generally graded as quality A and fetches the full organic premium.  
In 2010-11, the season of our fieldwork, Verma cultivated three varieties of basmati: Taraori, 386 
and the local type-3. As already noted, the buyer firm actively promotes the long-grain Taraori and 386 
varieties, both with an average grain length of more than 7mm.6 Before 2009, Verma cultivated another 
variety called Kasturi instead of the 386. As Kasturi is not acknowledged as proper basmati by 
exporting firms, Verma sold it to other buyers in the local market. Thus, the requirement of a standard 
kernel length, based on what qualifies as proper basmati for export, dissociated Verma from the older 
varieties of basmati he cultivated and their crop-sale networks (e.g. for Kasturi). This detachment 
proceeded at the same time as his attachment with new varieties such as 386 and Taraori. The new 
varieties also associated Verma with materials involved in dealing with diseases, such as the plant 
drooping problem on Taraori, which were only encountered on these varieties.  
The above reconfiguration of Verma’s practices and agencement was enacted by the product 
standard of long kernel length, which, on his field, manifested as process standards (e.g. permitted 
varieties of basmati to be cultivated). At the same time, Verma’s existing agencement allowed tinkering 
with the process standards, for instance, by not cultivating the seeds (of Taraori and 386) sold to him by 
the firm but rather the seeds saved on his own farm. He claimed that the seeds sold by the firm were 
                                                
6 The buyer firm, while promoting Taraori and 386 varieties, reluctantly purchased the local type-3 variety till 2010. During 
the course of our fieldwork, in November 2010, the firm announced that from 2011 it will only buy the long-grain Taraori 
and 386 varieties. A little earlier, in August 2010, the ministry of commerce and industry (government of India) issued a 
notification specifying the minimum length of basmati grain that can be exported to be 6.61 mm (Directorate General of 
Foreign Trade, 2010), thereby excluding many varieties of basmati from the export market. 
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inferior than those he saved on his farm. The foregoing represents a case of mutual adjustment in which 
the standard (of kernel length) transformed Verma’s practices, while being adapted to his agencement 
(cultivating only farm-saved seeds of the long-grain varieties).  
In other cases, GVC standards did not modify Verma’s practices. Consider for instance plant 
protection practices. In each cultivation season, he uses a mixture of crushed neem leaves and cow 
urine as a bio-pesticide at different stages of the basmati plant’s growth: in the nursery, during 
transplanting, when the tillers sprout, and finally during the flowering stage. According to Verma, his 
plant protection practices are generally quite effective and no severe pest attacks or hard to tackle plant 
diseases were observed on the farm during the last few years. Cow urine is a central element in 
Verma’s agencement for pest control. For instance, in 2010, he used a mixture of cow urine, turmeric 
and water to tackle the leaf blast disease on basmati plants. Cow urine is considered to be an important 
ingredient of organic plant protection in many parts of India (Sofia et al, 2006). Since autumn 2010 
however, the buyer firm has attempted to ban the use of cow urine in Rajnagar, citing the reason that 
US phytosanitary standards did not permit the use of urine in cultivation of food for human 
consumption.7 Many contracted farmers stopped using cow urine due to this ban. In Verma’s 
agencement, on the other hand, the ban was defied. Thus, the cow urine proscription did not format 
Verma’s cultivation practices and no new dissociations and associations were made in his agencement. 
Yet this defiance of a process standard did not hinder the successful production of a standardized 
product by Verma’s agencement. 
Cow urine then became an ungoverned yet central element of Verma’s agencement. Similarly, 
other elements and associations from outside the purview of GVC governance played an important role 
                                                
7 We were unable to elicit sufficient details about this US standard during our interviews with the buyer firm. We searched 
for the proscription on the internet, but did not find it on US government websites. As a result, we assume that it is a private 
standard defined by the buyer of the contracting buyer firm, which markets the rice in the US.  
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in the production of standardized basmati. These associations ungoverned by the GVC include his 
relationship with several local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that promote organic 
cultivation methods. In addition to providing training to other farmers on behest of these NGOs, 
Verma’s farm is used as a demonstration site for organic techniques such as vermicompost pits and bio-
pesticide preparation. He also travels to different parts of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh as an 
ambassador of organic farming. His successes with organic cultivation and experimentation have been 
featured in local newspapers, taking his fame beyond the ambit of his own travels. In fact, his travels 
and fame have situated him as the farmer-face of the UOCB’s organic contract farming programme. 
This is exemplified by his membership of the UOCB’s advisory council and the fact that he is one of 
the first farmers in Rajnagar visited by researchers like us (guided by UOCB employees). The same 
fame has also played a role in his selection as a seed supplier to the buyer firm in 2011-12 (which 
generally procured its seeds from fields outside Rajnagar). Thus, in Verma’s agencement, practices and 
associations outside the scope of GCC governance are also in a sense inside the enacted world of 
contracts, standards and certifications.  
To sum up, Verma’s cultivation practices were formatted by some product/process standards 
such as grain length and variety, while the latter were modified at the same time. Through mutual 
adjustments, these standards became procedural and discursive elements of Verma’s agencements 
which described his cultivation practices accurately. However, in case of other (process) standards such 
as the ‘ban’ on cow urine, no mutual adjustments took place and the standards were unable to further 
reconfigure Verma’s agencement or change practices. In fact, these standards were simply rejected by 
Verma’s agencement. Additionally, ungoverned discursive and material elements in Verma’s 
agencement played an important role in the making of a standardized product. Thus, Verma’s 
agencement exhibits ‘inclusive exclusions’ where officially ‘ungoverned’ associations and practices 
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help to produce the desired product, blurring the boundary between the governed and the ungoverned, 
the ‘global’ and the local. 
Shrimati Sareen 
Shrimati Sareen cultivates organic basmati for export on about a third of her 1 hectare. Although 
farming is a household profession, she is de facto in charge of the fields as her husband and son both do 
non-farm work outside the village. Her husband only helps out on the farm during weekend trips home. 
Sareen is not actively involved in decision-making and other activities of the farmers’ federation in 
Rajnagar. According to her, the chairman of the federation only asks her to join a meeting to display 
the numerical strength of his organic federation when external NGO representatives or government 
officials are visiting. Sareen first came into contact with the chairman of Rajnagar’s farmers’ federation 
and an employee of the UOCB in 2003-4. They had visited her house to explain the advantages of 
organic farming. Some other farmers from her village were also present at this gathering, but Sareen 
was the only one who immediately switched to organic basmati. As she was already using cow-dung as 
a fertilizer and she has enough cattle on the farm, Sareen felt that it would be easy to make the switch 
from non-organic to organic cultivation. However, looking back she feels that this switch has not been 
smooth: her crop yields have fallen; and she spends more money per acre for hiring labourers to do 
manual weeding to replace the spraying of a chemical weedicides.  
Sareen only cultivated the two long-grain varieties of basmati promoted by the firm: Taraori and 
386. She purchased seeds on credit at the federation office in Rajnagar (the cost of the seeds was 
deducted from the amount she received at the time of crop sale). The buyer firm’s inspector directed 
Sareen not to save seeds on her own farm because this might affect the quality of her produce. This is 
why Sareen fears that if she cultivates her own farm-saved seeds, the firm will not buy the paddy after 
the harvest. Thus, the reconfiguration of Sareen’s agencement entailed dissociation from non-long 
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grain basmati varieties and from the procedures (and eventually the skills) of saving seeds on her farm.   
To further illustrate the formatting of Sareen’s practices through the enactment of standards, we 
focus on plant protection practices. During the 2010 season, Sareen’s basmati plants suffered from leaf 
blast, leaf curl and attacks from a rice bug that left many grains empty. Several new entities were 
incorporated into Sareen’s agencement to protect the plants: first, she approached another farmer 
(Verma, in this particular instance) for assistance who gave her a bio-pesticide that should be mixed 
with raw sugar (jaggery) and sprayed in the field. Sareen planned to return this favour with some 
groundnuts harvested from her fields later in the year. When the pest problems persisted, she asked her 
husband to buy bio-pesticides at the federation office. There he was advised to buy the Camson 
products, Calphomil and Calmonas, and given directions on how to use them. Note that, through its 
package of practices (PoP), the firm prescribes the use of these products, alongside other methods, for 
pest control. Back on the farm, following the instructions received at the federation office, these two 
packets were mixed with 100 liters of water. In order to spray the bio-pesticides, a neighbour’s machine 
had to be borrowed. The bio-pesticides were sprayed before the ripening stage of the grain, and again 
after the rains in October. Sareen could not spray a third time later in the season because the spraying 
machine was broken by then and she was not able to borrow or rent another one. So even though the 
recommended biopesticides were used twice, basmati plants in Sareen’s fields were inflicted by several 
diseases till the time of harvest, lowering the crop yield. This story illustrates how a range of governed 
and ungoverned entities (bio-pesticides, spraying machines, pests, basmati plants and the farmer 
herself) made each other act, not always collaboratively, while collectively producing the agencement’s 
actions. 
In Sareen’s agencement, different product (e.g. grain length) and process (e.g. prescribed bio-
pesticides) standards, channelled through mediators such as the firm’s PoP, its field inspector and the 
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federation office, dissociated her from seeds and bio-pesticides produced on her farm as well as older 
exchange networks she may have had for procuring farm-inputs and selling her crop. At the same time, 
they associated her with seeds and bio-pesticides sold by the firm through the federation office. The 
new seeds and bio-pesticides also appear to have associated with different pests and diseases on the 
basmati plant. However, note that these new ‘governed’ associations were accompanied by 
‘ungoverned’ associations such as Sareen’s gift-like exchange of bio-pesticides and groundnuts with 
another farmer and her borrowing of a spraying-machine from a neighbour. Importantly, similar to 
Verma, these (external to the GVC) ungoverned associations facilitated the production of a 
standardized product on her farm. Yet, unlike Verma, the inclusive exclusions in Sareen’s agencement 
did not afford a refusal or defiance of any process standards. Instead, they facilitated a high degree of 
adherence to the same. 
The GVC standards therefore successfully formatted Sareen’s cultivation practices and 
reconfigured her agencement. Yet we did not observe any modifications of the standards themselves as 
they were ‘localized’ into her agencement. Thus, the enactment process in Sareen’s agencement was 
not based on mutual but rather unilateral adjustments.  
Conclusions and implications 
By analyzing the localized enactment of standards, certifications and contracts of a global value chain, 
we have shown that the power of these technologies of governing in formatting farmers’ practices into 
compliance is thoroughly relational. Different farmers’ agencements ‘localized’ the same standards 
differently to produce degrees of (selective) compliance. The uneven contingent nature of this 
standardization highlights the limitations of the programmatic frameworks employed by existing GVC 
governance and governmentality studies, which assume that the objects of governance are normalized 
without delving into how this normalization is organized and differently enacted in socio-material 
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practices. In our work, the different degrees of compliance observed in farmers’ practices were 
relational effects due to, a) different roles played by the ‘same’ actors (extension officers, basmati 
plants, pests) in the two farmers’ agencements, and b) the natures of their inclusive exclusions. The 
latter highlight that in order to fully understand governing, we need to look beyond the official frames 
of governance. Such an anthropology of standards, or standardization, demonstrates how private 
corporate governance extends to and encroaches upon non-contractual, non-GVC, sociotechnical 
relations of farmers. 
The different, agencement-specific, enactment of standards and certifications produces a divide 
between the singularity of ‘official’ standards/protocols (as statements) and the multiplicity of actual 
practices (as actions) encountered in the field. Designed by public and private regulators in importing 
countries ostentatiously to meet the demands and ensure the safety of their consumers, GVC standards’ 
official scripts are often sluggish or reluctant to respond to actual practices of farmers, particularly 
those from developing countries (Ponte, 2011). However, the disjuncture between singular GVC 
statements and plural actions is not something ‘unfortunate’ (cf. Lewis and Mosse, 2006:5), which is 
eliminated through more responsive standards or the deployment of stronger surveillance techniques 
geared toward producing total compliance among farmer-suppliers. Instead, this disjuncture is 
productive because it permits relative autonomy to farmers’ practices (from the GVC standards) and 
highlights the mediating work of different entities which situate ex-situ standards in an agencement, if 
possible adjusting them to produce an alignment between ‘localized’ descriptions of the standards and 
actual cultivation practices. In fact, without the relative autonomy and adaptations based on farmers’ 
in-situ experiments, agricultural practices that ‘fit’ her socio-material agencement are unlikely to be 
found. Without these situated practices, good basmati is unlikely to be produced.  
In general, the multiplicity of farmers’ practices, the plurality of types of agencements, which 
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lays hidden beneath singular standards is perhaps more important to nurture than the controlled 
production of any desired worlds. Public policy must ensure that this diversity of practices is not 
decimated by forcing farmers into compliance through the deployment of draconian technologies of 
surveillance and their associated discourses in a totalitarian programme of government. Such forced 
compliance may not even be a fruitful result for buyer firms: moving farmers away from their in-situ 
practices into formalized-standardized ones can threaten crop yields and the quality of the grains 
produced (as the case of Shrimati Sareen demonstrates). Thus, it may be in the interest of buyer firms 
to nurture the diversity of cultivation practices that are or become well-adjusted to individual farms’ 
socio-ecological conditions, rather than promoting standard ‘best’ practices uniformly. 
However, this raises a question about the appropriate size of the disjuncture between GVC/GCC 
standards and farmers’ practices. While too little disjuncture may straitjacket the farmers, too much of 
it ends up making the standards meaningless in practice, undermining the work of other actors in the 
GVC and threatening to compromise the ‘quality’ of the product. Too much disjuncture may be 
particularly problematic in the case of standards/protocols that are generally considered as beneficial 
for the environment (organic) or for farm-workers (fair trade). One route to reducing any adverse 
impacts of this disjuncture may be through participatory ‘democratic’ deliberation of the standard-
making process (before the enactment on farms), opening it up to non-experts (Busch, 2012). However, 
three decades of experience with participatory development in the third world has shown that even in 
open consultative initiatives, knowledges and exigencies of some people are marginalized (for a recent 
review, see Arora and Romijn, 2012). The latter generally were the less privileged members of 
assumed communities of the poor or smallholders. Thus, any democratization of standard-making or 
implementation processes, if successful, can only be partial.    
Overall, the concepts of agencement and enactment were useful in studying the re-shaping of 
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farmers’ practices through GVC governance. They allowed us to, a) fruitfully open the black box of 
standardization by sensitizing us to different associations and dissociations produced in the farmers’ 
socio-material worlds; b) study the (mis)alignment between GVC standards’ official scripts, their 
modified descriptions in farmers’ agencements (written in diaries and oral) and the actual cultivation 
practices; c) analyze the ‘inclusive exclusions’. However, in our study, unlike what Callon (2007) 
claims, we found that not all constituent elements of an agencement become mutually adjusted to each 
other. Instead, many adjustments in the GVC standards/protocols and in other socio-material elements 
were not mutual but unilateral. In general, the (relational) power and equipment required to make 
others adjust are thus not equally distributed among different elements of an agencement (cf. Çalişkan 
and Callon, 2010: 13-14). This highlights the importance of making ‘inequality of agencies’ central to 
future work on socio-technical agencements.  
Finally, some limitations of the present article: first, we did not explicitly focus on the enactment 
of critical socio-cultural categories of caste and gender, which interfered with the enactment of the 
GVC standards (cf. Moser, 2006). Second, our explication of difference between farmers’ agencement 
(and enactment) would have been made stronger if our analysis was not limited to two ethnographic 
cases. Third, during the fieldwork, we were unable to unearth the life-histories of the two agencements 
under focus. As a result, we focused on those elements that were ejected, modified or assimilated into 
the farmers’ agencements as the GVC standards were ‘localized’. Thus, we do not know how the pre-
GVC agencements were assembled through processes of translation between different (constituent) 
actors’ passions and interests. Such an historical picture will not only allow a better understanding of 
the production of difference as the immediate effect of (prior) difference (Deleuze, 1995), but also the 
(re)formation of inequality between agencies that constitute an agencement. We hope to take up some 
of these challenges in future work. 
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